Do Medical Doctors Respond to Economic Incentives?
Maria Di Tommaso () and
No 3802, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich
A longitudinal analysis of married physicians labor supply is carried out on Norwegian data from 1997 to 1999. The model utilized for estimation implies that physicians can choose among 10 different job packages which are a combination of part time/full time, hospital/primary care, private/public sector, and not working. Their current choice is influenced by past available options due to a taste persistence parameter in the utility function. In the estimation we take into account the budget constraint, including all features of the tax system. Our results imply that an overall wage increase or a tax cut moves married physicians towards full time job packages, in particular to full time jobs in the private sector. But the overall and aggregate labor supply elasticities in the population of employed doctors are rather low compared to previous estimates.
Keywords: physicians' labor supply; multi-sector; panel data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J22 I10 C35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Do medical doctors respond to economic incentives? (2013)
Working Paper: Do Medical Doctors Respond to Economic Incentives? (2012)
Working Paper: Do medical doctors respond to economic incentives? (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3802
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