The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements

Lutz-Alexander Busch and Ignatius Horstmann

No 200010, University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series from University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics

Abstract: We use a two-issue bargaining model with asymmetric information to study agent choice of how to structure bargaining. We uncover the settings in which different agenda structures are chosen in equilibrium, how the order in which issues are bargained over matters, and what impact the rules for implementing agreements have. If agreements are implemented as they are reached, ``easy'' issues are negotiated first and ``hard'' issues later; if agreements are implemented only after all issues are settled, then it is size that matters, with large issues settled first. All parties prefer the former rules of implementation to the latter.

Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1354&context=economicsresrpt (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden

Related works:
Journal Article: The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements (2002)
Working Paper: The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements (2000)
Working Paper: The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements (2000)
Working Paper: The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwo:uwowop:200010

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://economics.uw ... itting_ordering.html
The price is Paper copy available by mail at a cost of $10.00 Canadian each.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series from University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics Department of Economics, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().