Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property

John Weymark

No 409, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: A social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on each person's report of his most-preferred alternatives on the range of this function. On many domains, strategy-proofness implies the tops-only property, provided that the range of the social choice function satisfies some regularity condition. The existing proofs of this result are model specific. In this article, a general proof strategy is proposed for showing that a strategy-proof social choice function satisfies the tops-only property when everyone has the same set of admissible preferences.

Keywords: Social choice; strategy-proofness; option sets; tops-only property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-04, Revised 2006-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu04-w09R.pdf Revision, 2006 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategy‐Proofness and the Tops‐Only Property (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:0409

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