Strategy‐Proofness and the Tops‐Only Property

John Weymark

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008, vol. 10, issue 1, 7-26

Abstract: A social choice function satisfies the tops‐only property if the chosen alternative only depends on each person's report of his most‐preferred alternatives on the range of this function. On many domains, strategy‐proofness implies the tops‐only property provided that the range of the social choice function satisfies some regularity condition. The existing proofs of this result are model specific. In this paper, a general proof strategy is proposed for showing that a strategy‐proof social choice function satisfies the tops‐only property when everyone has the same set of admissible preferences.

Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00349.x

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Working Paper: Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property (2006)
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