On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games

Nizar Allouch and Myrna Wooders

No 14-00013, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be approximated by equal-treatment ε-cores of the games themselves. Our proof is novel in that we rely on a fixed point theorem.

Keywords: NTU games; core; approximate cores; small group effectiveness; coalition formation; payoff dependent balancedness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games (2017)
Working Paper: On the Nonemptiness of Approximate Cores of Large Games (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:vuecon-14-00013

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