# On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games

Nizar Allouch and Myrna Wooders ()

Economic Theory, 2017, vol. 63, issue 1, No 8, 209 pages

Abstract: Abstract We provide a new proof of the nonemptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their “balanced cover games,” which are nonempty, can be approximated by equal-treatment $$\varepsilon$$ ε -cores of the games themselves. Our proof is novel in that we develop a limiting payoff possibilities set and rely on a fixed point theorem.

Keywords: NTU games; Core; Approximate cores; Small group effectiveness; Coalition formation; Payoff-dependent balancedness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Nonemptiness of Approximate Cores of Large Games (2014)
Working Paper: On the Nonemptiness of Approximate Cores of Large Games (2014)
Working Paper: On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games (2014)
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