Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences

Andrea Attar, Gwenael Piaser () and Nicolás Porteiro

No 2006_28, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"

Abstract: This paper examines the role of the direct mechanisms in common agency games. We show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for a version of the Revelation Principle to hold in finite generic games. The result goes through without imposing any restriction on the principals� payoffs. Therefore, it is still possible to restrict attention to direct mechanisms without any loss of generality even when competition over contracts is considered.

Keywords: Revelation Principle; Common Agency; Separable Preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Common agency games with separable preferences (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_28

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