Common agency games with separable preferences
Andrea Attar,
Dipjyoti Majumdar,
Gwenael Piaser () and
Nicolás Porteiro
No 2003102, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Abstract:
This paper examines the role of the revelation principle in common agency games. We show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for the revelation principle to hold. Therefore, it is still possible to restrict attention to direct mechanisms without any loss of generality even when competition over contracts is considered.
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences (2006) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2003102
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