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What Matters for Whistleblowing on Tax Evaders? Survey and Experimental Evidence

Armenak Antinyan (), Luca Corazzini () and Filippo Pavesi
Additional contact information
Armenak Antinyan: International Academy of Business and Economics, Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
Luca Corazzini: Department of Economics, University of Venice \"Ca’ Foscari\"

No 07/2018, Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics

Abstract: Whistleblowing is a powerful tool that the tax authorities of various countries use to curb tax evasion. Nonetheless, the determinants shaping one’s positive attitude toward whistleblowing on tax evaders are rather understudied. We investigate the relationship between trust in the government and the attitude toward whistleblowing on tax evaders. We use data from two survey experiments conducted in Italy and the US, as well as from a unique national household survey administered in the Republic of Armenia. Our findings indicate that the level of trust in the government positively influences individuals’ attitude toward whistleblowing, with this effect being robust across countries and data sources.

Keywords: Government Trust; Whistleblowing; Tax Evasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue, nep-law, nep-pbe and nep-tra
Date: 2018-12
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