Free riders and strong reciprocators coexist in public goods experiments: evolutionary foundations

Angelo Antoci, Paolo Russu () and Luca Zarri

No 55/2009, Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics

Abstract: Experimental evidence indicates that free riders and strongly reciprocal papers coexist in the public goods game framework. By means of an evolutionary analysis, we provide an endogenization of this behavioral regularity.

Keywords: Free Riding; Cooperation; Strong Reciprocity; Public Goods Game; Evolutionary Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 C73 D74 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7
Date: 2009-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dse.univr.it//workingpapers/WP55.pdf First version (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Journal Article: Free riders and strong reciprocators coexist in public goods experiments: evolutionary foundations (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ver:wpaper:55/2009

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael Reiter ().