Free riders and strong reciprocators coexist in public goods experiments: evolutionary foundations
Paolo Russu () and
No 55/2009, Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics
Experimental evidence indicates that free riders and strongly reciprocal papers coexist in the public goods game framework. By means of an evolutionary analysis, we provide an endogenization of this behavioral regularity.
Keywords: Free Riding; Cooperation; Strong Reciprocity; Public Goods Game; Evolutionary Game Theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 C73 D74 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://dse.univr.it//workingpapers/WP55.pdf First version (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Free riders and strong reciprocators coexist in public goods experiments: evolutionary foundations (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ver:wpaper:55/2009
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from University of Verona, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael Reiter ().