Learning, Memory, and Inertia

Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper explores the impact of memory in standard models of learning and evolution in games where a fininite number of agents display imitation behavior, focusing on coordination games (as in Kandori et al (1993)) and N-player games where spiteful behavior allows to discard Nash equilibria. It is shown that the way inertia is modeled in such examples actually entails a strong "no-memory" assumption. Once inertia is removed (or modeled otherwise), the addition of bounded memory changes the predictions dramatically. The analysis highlights the stability properties of Nash outcomes in purely evolutionary contexts with a finite population of agents.

JEL-codes: E62 F43 H54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-08
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