Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria

Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the stability of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of symmetric games, viewed as population profiles in dynamical systems with learning within a single, finite population. Alternative models of imitation and myopic best reply are considered and combined with different assumptions about the speed of adjustment. It is found that specific refinements of mixed Nash equilibria serve to identify focal rest points of these dynamics in general games. The relationship between both concepts is studied. In the 2 x 2 case, both imitation and myopic best reply yield strong stability results for the same type of mixed Nash equilibria.

JEL-codes: C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-10
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