Evolution and Learning in Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs

Josef Hofbauer and William Sandholm

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider four models of evolution and learning in games which rely on perturbations of payoffs, including stochastic fictitious play. In all cases, we establish global stability results for zerosum games, games with an interior ESS, potential games, and supermodular games.

JEL-codes: C72 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-03
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https://papersecon.univie.ac.at/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0205.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:vie0205

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