The Evolutionary Logic of Feeling Small

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Ana Ania

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: In a (generalized symmetric aggregative game, payoffs depend only on individual strategy and an aggregate of all strategies. Players behaving as if they were negligible would optimize taking the aggregate as given. We provide evolutionary and dynamic foundations for such behavior when the game satisfies supermodularity conditions. The results obteined are also useful to characterize evolutionarily stable strategies in a finite population.

JEL-codes: C72 D41 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-12
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