Does Learning Lead to Coordination in Market Clearing Institutions?

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Georg Kirchsteiger

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the question of whether traders learn to coordinate on a trading institution that guarantees market clearing, or whether other market institutions can survive in the long run. While we find that the market clearing institution is indeed always stable under a general class of learning dynamics, it turns out that also other, non-market clearing institutions are stable. Hence, in the long run traders may fail to coordinate exclusively in market clearing institutions.

JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12
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https://papersecon.univie.ac.at/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0319.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Does learning lead to coordination on market clearing institutions (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:vie0319

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