Trees and Extensive Forms

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-defined extensive form game. Without relying on simplifying finiteness or discreteness assumptions, we characterize the class of game trees for which (a) extensive forms can be defined and (b) all pure strategy combinations induce unique outcomes. The generality of the set-up covers “exotic” cases, like stochastic games or decision problems in continuous time (differential games). We find that the latter class fulfills the first, but not the second requirement.

JEL-codes: C72 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://papersecon.univie.ac.at/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0506.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Trees and extensive forms (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:vie0506

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paper Administrator ().