Strategic Exploitation of a Common-Property Resource under Uncertainty

Christos Koulovatianos, Elena Antoniadou and Leonard Mirman

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study the impact of uncertainty on the strategies and dynamics of symmetric noncooperative games among players who exploit a non-excludable resource that reproduces under uncertainty. We focus on a particular class of games that deliver a unique Nash equilibrium in linear-symmetric strategies of resource exploitation. We show that, for this class of games, the tragedy of the commons is always present. For various changes in the riskiness of the random primitives of the model we provide general characterizations of features of the model that explain links between the degree of riskiness and strategic exploitation decisions. Finally, we provide a specific example that demonstrates the usefulness of our general results and, within the specific example, we study cases where increases in risk amplify or mitigate the tragedy of the commons.

JEL-codes: C61 C72 C73 D43 D90 O13 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06
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Journal Article: Strategic exploitation of a common-property resource under uncertainty (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:vie0703

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