On Bundling in Insurance Markets

Maarten C. W. Janssen () and Vladimir Karamychev
Additional contact information
Maarten C. W. Janssen: https://econ.univie.ac.at

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the welfare consequences of bundling different risks in one insurance contract in markets where adverse selection is important. This question is addressed in the context of a competitive insurance model a la Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) with two sources of risk. Accordingly, there are four possible types of individuals and many incentive compatibility constraints to be considered. We show that the effect of bundling on these incentive compatibility constraints is such that bundling always yields a welfare improvement, and this result only holds when all four types have strictly positive shares in the population. Due to the competition between insurance companies, these benefits accrue to consumers who potentially have fewer contracts to choose from, but benefit from the better sorting possibilities due to bundling.

JEL-codes: D82 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://papersecon.univie.ac.at/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0809.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:vie0809

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paper Administrator ().