Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions

Simon Weidenholzer

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: The present note revisits a result by Kim and Wong (2010) showing that any strict Nash equilibrium of a coordination game can be supported as a long run equilibrium by properly adding dominated strategies. We show that in the circular city model of local interactions the selection of 1/2-dominant strategies remains when adding strictly dominated strategies if interaction is "decentral". Conversely, if the local interaction structure is "central" by adding properly suited dominated strategies any equilibrium strategy of the original game can be supported as long run equilibrium. Classification- JEL: C72, D83

Date: 2010-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://papersecon.univie.ac.at/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie1005.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:vie1005

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paper Administrator ().