Immigration and voting on the size and the composition of public spending

Karin Mayr-Dorn

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper develops a model to analyze the effects of immigration by skill on the outcome of a majority vote among natives on both the size as well as the composition of public spending. Public spending can be of two types, spending on rival goods (transfers) and on non-rival goods (public goods). I find that relative preferences for the different types of public spending are crucial for the effects of immigration. In particular, immigrants of either skill can increase (decrease) the size of total public spending, if natives have a relative preference for spending on public goods (spending on transfers). I provide some illustration of potential relative spending preferences in OECD countries using panel data for 1980 - 2010.

JEL-codes: F2 H4 H5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10
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https://papersecon.univie.ac.at/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie1101.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Immigration and Voting on the Size and the Composition of Public Spending (2013)
Working Paper: Immigration and voting on the size and the composition of public spending (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:vie1101

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