Non-cooperative resource exploitation by patient players

Gerhard Sorger and Tapan Mitra

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a discrete-time dynamic game in which a finite number of players extract a non-renewable resource and derive consumption solely from the extracted amount (cake-eating game). Markov-perfect Nash equilibria can be constructed in this game not only if the players have time-preference factors that are smaller than 1, but also if these factors are equal to or even larger than 1. We demonstrate this result both for the case of identical players and for the case of heterogeneous players. In addition we study the influence of the model parameters on the equilibrium.

JEL-codes: C73 Q30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10
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Journal Article: Noncooperative Resource Exploitation by Patient Players (2015)
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