Harvesting the Commons

Partha Dasgupta (), Tapan Mitra and Gerhard Sorger
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Partha Dasgupta: https://econ.univie.ac.at

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study a socio-ecological model in which a continuum of consumers harvest a common property renewable natural resource. Markov perfect Nash equilibria of the cor- responding non-cooperative game are derived and are compared with collectively optimal harvesting policies. The underlying mechanisms that drive open-access commons in our model are shaped by population size, harvesting costs, and the ecosystem's productivity. If other things equal population is small relative to harvesting costs, unmanaged commons do not face destruction. More strikingly, they are harvested at the collectively optimal rate. Property rights do not matter in that parametric regime because the resource has no social scarcity value. However, if other things equal population is large relative to harvesting costs, open-access renewable natural resources suffer from the tragedy of the commons. Property rights matter there because the resource has a social scarcity price. The pop- ulation size relative to harvesting costs at which the socio-ecological system bifurcates is an increasing function of the ecosystem's productivity. A sudden crash in productivity, population overshoot, or decline in harvesting costs can tip an unmanaged common into ruin. The model provides a way to interpret historical and archaeological findings on the collapse of those societies that have been studied by scholars.

JEL-codes: C73 D01 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Harvesting the Commons (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:vie1608

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