Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid without Knowing what Otheres are Doing

Bernhard Kasberger and Karl Schlag

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: Bidding optimally in first-price auctions is complicated. In the classical equilibrium framework, optimal bidding relies on detailed beliefs about other bidders' value distributions and bidding functions. This article shows how to and a robust bidding rule that does well with minimal information and thus achieves good performance in many situations. Robust bidding means to minimize the maximal difference between the payoff and the payo that could be achieved if one knew the other bidders' value distributions and bidding functions. We derive robust bidding rules under di erent scenarios, including complete uncertainty. Our bid recommendations are evaluated with experimental data.

JEL-codes: C72 D44 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://papersecon.univie.ac.at/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie1707.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid Without Knowing What Others Are Doing (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:vie1707

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paper Administrator ().