Does the Strength of Incentives Matter for Elected Officials? A Look at Tax Collectors
Sutirtha Bagchi ()
No 34, Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series from Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics
In Pennsylvania local property taxes are collected by elected officials, known as tax collectors, whose compensation varies widely in both structure and level across municipalities. This paper analyses the existence of a pay-performance relationship for these officials. Using data on the percentage of real estate taxes that are actually collected at the municipal level, the paper finds that as the compensation tax collectors receive goes up, they collect more in taxes. This relationship is however true only for collectors who are compensated on a commission basis and not for collectors compensated on the basis of a flat salary. The paper also finds no relationship between the share of votes received by the tax collector and the percentage of property taxes collected during the previous term. This observation may account for the lack of a positive relationship between pay and performance for collectors compensated on the basis of a salary.
Keywords: Tax Collectors; Politician Salary; Productivity; Pay for Performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H70 J45 J33 D72 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm, nep-iue, nep-lma, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vil:papers:34
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