Does the Strength of Incentives Matter for Elected Officials? A Look at Tax Collectors
Sutirtha Bagchi
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2021, vol. 21, issue 3, 967-1012
Abstract:
In Pennsylvania local property taxes are collected by elected officials, known as tax collectors, whose compensation varies widely in both structure and level across municipalities. This paper analyses the existence of a pay-performance relationship for these officials. Using data on the percentage of property taxes that are actually collected at the municipal level, the paper finds that as the compensation tax collectors receive goes up, they collect more in taxes. This relationship is however true only for collectors who are compensated on a commission basis and not for collectors compensated on the basis of a flat salary.
Keywords: pay for performance; politician salary; tax collectors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:21:y:2021:i:3:p:967-1012:n:4
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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2020-0008
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