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Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations over a Single Good

Marco LiCalzi () and Antonio Nicolo' ()

No 152, Working Papers from Department of Applied Mathematics, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia

Abstract: This paper studies efficient and egalitarian allocations over a single heterogeneous and infinitely divisible good. We prove the existence of such allocations using only measure-theoretic arguments. Under the additional assumption of complete information, we identify a sufficient condition on agents' preferences that makes it possible to apply the Pazner-Schmeidler rule for uniquely selecting an efficient egalitarian equivalent allocation. Finally, we exhibit a simple procedure that implements the Pazner-Schmeidler selection in a subgame-perfect equilibrium.

Keywords: egalitarism; equity; fair division; implementation; no-envy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 C70 D30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2007-06
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Published in Economic Theory 40, 2009, 27-45

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http://virgo.unive.it/wpideas/storage/2007wp152.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations over a Single Good (2005) Downloads
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