Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations over a Single Good
Marco LiCalzi () and
Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper studies efficient and egalitarian allocations over a single heterogeneous and infinitely divisible good. We prove the existence of such allocations using only measure-theoretic arguments. Under the additional assumption of complete information, we identify a sufficient condition on agents’ preferences that makes it possible to apply the Pazner-Schmeidler rule for uniquely selecting an efficient egalitarian equivalent allocation. Finally, we exhibit a simple procedure that implements the Pazner-Schmeidler selection in a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Keywords: egalitarism; equity; fair division; implementation; no-envy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 D2 D3 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 20. 20 pages, pdf, prepared from pdftex
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Journal Article: Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good (2009)
Working Paper: Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations over a Single Good (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0510014
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