Punitive sanctions and the transition rate from welfare to work

Gerard van den Berg, Bas van der Klaauw and Jan C. van Ours

No 33, Serie Research Memoranda from VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics

Abstract: In The Netherlands, the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically low. Most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search effort that are imposed by the welfare agency. If they do not, then a sanction in the form of a temporarily benefit reduction can be imposed. This paper investigates the effect of such sanctions on the transition from welfare to work using a unique set of rich administrative data on welfare recipients in The Netherlands. We find that the imposition of sanctions substantially increases the individual transition rate from welfare to work. We also describe the other determinants of the transition from welfare to work.

JEL-codes: E24 H55 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate from Welfare to Work (2004)
Working Paper: Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate From Welfare to Work (2000)
Working Paper: Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate from Welfare to Work (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vua:wpaper:1998-33

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