A short note on discrimination and favoritism in the labor market

Nicolas Salamanca and Jan Feld

No 19543, Working Paper Series from Victoria University of Wellington, School of Economics and Finance

Abstract: We extend Becker’s model of discrimination by allowing firms to have discriminatory and favoring preferences simultaneously. We draw the two-preference parallel for the marginal firm, illustrate the implications for wage differentials, and consider the implied long-run equilibrium. In the short-run, wage differentials depend on relative preferences. However, in the long-run, market forces drive out discriminatory but not favoring firms.

Keywords: Wage gap; Nepotism; Firm preferences; Long-run equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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https://ir.wgtn.ac.nz/handle/123456789/19543

Related works:
Journal Article: A Short Note on Discrimination and Favoritism in the Labor Market (2017)
Working Paper: A Short Note on Discrimination and Favoritism in the Labor Market (2016)
Working Paper: A Short Note on Discrimination and Favoritism in the Labor Market (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vuw:vuwecf:19543

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