A Short Note on Discrimination and Favoritism in the Labor Market

Nicolas Salamanca and Jan Feld

No 10291, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We extend Becker's model of discrimination by allowing firms to have discriminatory and favoring preferences simultaneously. We draw the two-preference parallel for the marginal firm, illustrate the implications for wage differentials, and consider the implied long-run equilibrium. In the short-run, wage differentials depend on relative preferences. However, in the long-run, market forces drive out discriminatory but not favoring firms.

Keywords: firm preferences; nepotism; wage gap; long-run equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published - published in: BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2017, 17 (1), 20160133.

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp10291.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A Short Note on Discrimination and Favoritism in the Labor Market (2017)
Working Paper: A Short Note on Discrimination and Favoritism in the Labor Market (2016)
Working Paper: A short note on discrimination and favoritism in the labor market (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10291

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
library@iza.org

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte (hinte@iza.org).