Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting

Yasushi Asako ()

No 1906, Working Papers from Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics

Abstract: Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identiÖes the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when, (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of votersímost preferred policies is polarized.

Keywords: elections; political ambiguity; public promise; campaign platform; probabilistic voting; polarization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2019-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-upt
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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wap:wpaper:1906

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