Contract renegotiation in a Continuous State Space

Ed Nosal

Working Papers from University of Waterloo, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper I demonstrate the existence an initial incomplete contract that can subsequently be renegociated to the set of first best allocations in a fairly geneal principal-agent model when the state space is continuous.

Keywords: CONTRACTS; ECONOMIC MODELS; GAME THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C73 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1996
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Journal Article: Contract renegotiation in a continuous state space (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wat:wpaper:9614

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