Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills
Eliana Carranza,
Robert Garlick,
Kate Orkin () and
Neil Rankin
No 9345, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank
Abstract:
This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers' employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms.
Keywords: Rural Labor Markets; Labor Markets; Educational Sciences; Employment and Unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)
Downloads: (external link)
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/79791159 ... rkseekers-Skills.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills (2021) 
Working Paper: Job Search and Hiring with Two-sided Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills (2020) 
Working Paper: Job Search and Hiring with Two-sided Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills (2020) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:9345
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Roula I. Yazigi ().