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Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills

Eliana Carranza, Robert Garlick, Kate Orkin and Neil Rankin ()

No 9345, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers' employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms.

Keywords: Rural Labor Markets; Labor Markets; Educational Sciences; Employment and Unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/79791159 ... rkseekers-Skills.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Job Search and Hiring with Two-sided Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Job Search and Hiring with Two-sided Limited Information about Workseekers’ Skills (2020) Downloads
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