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Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools

Clare Leaver, Owen Ozier, Pieter Serneels () and Andrew Zeitlin

No 9395, Policy Research Working Paper Series from The World Bank

Abstract: This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile' or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.

Keywords: Educational Institutions&Facilities; Effective Schools and Teachers; Rural Labor Markets; Health Economics&Finance; Labor Markets; Disability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-09-11
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http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/44011159 ... -Primary-Schools.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Recruitment, effort, and retention effects of performance contracts for civil servants: Experimental evidence from Rwandan primary schools (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Recruitment, effort, and retention effects of performance contracts for civil servants: Experimental evidence from Rwandan primary schools (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools (2020) Downloads
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