Ambiguous Solicitation: Ambiguous Prescription

Robert Gazzale, Julian Jamison, Alexander Karlan and Dean Karlan
Additional contact information
Julian Jamison: Yale University
Alexander Karlan: Williams College, http://econ.williams.edu

No 2009-02, Department of Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics, Williams College

Abstract: We conduct a two-phase laboratory experiment, separated by several weeks. In the first phase, we conduct urn games intended to measure ambiguity aversion on a representative population of undergraduate students. In the second phase, we invite the students back with four different solicitation treatments, varying in the ambiguity of information regarding the task and the payout of the laboratory experiment. We find that those who return do not differ from the overall pool with respect to their ambiguity version. However, no solicitation treatment generates a representative sample. The ambiguous task treatment drives away the ambiguity averse disproportionally, and the detailed task treatment draws in the ambiguity averse disproportionally.

Keywords: laboratory experimental methods; experimental economics; laboratory selection effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B40 C81 C90 C91 D80 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2009-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Forthcoming in Economic Inquiry.

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Related works:
Journal Article: AMBIGUOUS SOLICITATION: AMBIGUOUS PRESCRIPTION (2013)
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