Endogenous shareholding auctions

Andrew Mackenzie () and Christian Trudeau
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Andrew Mackenzie: Department of Economics, Rutgers University

No 2603, Working Papers from University of Windsor, Department of Economics

Abstract: We introduce endogenous shareholding auctions for production economies where a monopolist must elicit consumer demand in order to determine price and quantity. Each of these auctions has the property that the auction's profit is distributed across the monopolist and the consumers in accordance with ownership shares that are determined over the course of the auction. We characterize this class, and a larger class, on the basis of standard axioms. Finally, we investigate optimal auctions according to both prior-free domination and subjective expected welfare.

Keywords: auctions; Groves mechanism; monopolist; regulations. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D24 D44 D47 D61 D63 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 62 pages
Date: 2026-07
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http://web2.uwindsor.ca/economics/RePEc/wis/pdf/2603.pdf First version, 2026 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Endogenous shareholding auctions (2026)
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