Endogenous shareholding auctions

Andrew Mackenzie and Christian Trudeau

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We introduce endogenous shareholding auctions for production economies where a designer must elicit demand in order to determine price and quantity. Each of these auctions has the property that the auction's profit is distributed across the designer and the bidders in accordance with ownership shares that are determined over the course of the auction. We characterize this class, and a larger class, on the basis of standard axioms. Finally, we investigate optimal auctions according to both prior-free domination and subjective expected welfare. Applications include public housing, voluntary separation, and monopoly regulation.

Date: 2026-07, Revised 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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https://arxiv.org/pdf/2607.02457 Latest version (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Endogenous shareholding auctions (2026)
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