Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees

Randall S. Kroszner and Thomas Stratmann

CRSP working papers from Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago

Date: 1998-12
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Related works:
Journal Article: Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees (1998)
Working Paper: Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory And Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees (1996)
Working Paper: Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services', Political Action Committees
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