Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory And Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees

Randall S. Kroszner and Thomas Stratmann

No 126, Working Papers from The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State

Date: 1996
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/262528/1/wp126.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees (1998)
Working Paper: Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees (1998)
Working Paper: Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services', Political Action Committees
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:cbscwp:126

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