Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions

George Mailath, Larry Samuelson and Avner Shaked

CARESS Working Papres from University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences

Abstract: This paper shows that Nash equilibria of a local-interaction game are equivalent to correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*) (1997)
Working Paper: Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
Working Paper: Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
Working Paper: Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions'
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