Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*)

Avner Shaked, Larry Samuelson and George Mailath
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Avner Shaked: Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-26, D-53113 Bonn, GERMANY

Economic Theory, 1997, vol. 9, issue 3, 556 pages

Abstract: This paper shows that Nash equilibria of a local-interaction game are equivalent to correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
Note: Received: October 3, 1995; revised version February 21, 1996
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Working Paper: Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
Working Paper: Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
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Working Paper: Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
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