Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

George Mailath and Stephen Morris

CARESS Working Papres from University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences

Abstract: In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to coordinate their behavior perfectly, and thus support cooperative outcomes with the threat of punishments. But with even a small amount of private monitoring, players' private histories may lead them to have sufficiently different views of the world that such coordination on punishments is no longer possible. Even though grim trigger is a public perfect equilibrium (PPE) in games with public monitoring, it often fails to be an equilibrium in arbitrarily close games with private monitoring. If a PPE has players' behavior conditioned only on finite histories, then it induces an equilibrium in all close-by games with private monitoring. This implies a folk theorem for repeated games with almost-public almost-perfect monitoring.

Date: 1999-08, Revised 2000-09-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2002)
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2001)
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2001)
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2000)
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring (1999)
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (1999)
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring'
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