Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

George Mailath and Stephen Morris

No 1236, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to coordinate their behavior perfectly, and thus support cooperative outcomes with the threat of punishments. But with even a small amount of private monitoring, players' private histories may lead them to have sufficiently different views of the world that such coordination on punishments is no longer possible (we describe a simple strategy profile that is a perfect public equilibrium of a repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect public monitoring, and yet is not an equilibrium for arbitrarily close games with private monitoring). If a perfect public equilibrium has players' behavior conditioned only on finite histories, then it induces an equilibrium in all close-by games with private monitoring. This implies a folk theorem for repeated games with almost-public almost-perfect monitoring.

Pages: 52 pages
Date: 1999-10
Note: CFP 1034.
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (2002), 102(1): 189-228

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Journal Article: Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2002)
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2001)
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2001)
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2000)
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2000)
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring (1999)
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Working Paper: Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring'
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