Abstention in Dynamical Models of Spatial Voting

Baerbel M. R. Stadler

Working Papers from Santa Fe Institute

Abstract: We consider a model of platform adaptation in spatial voting focussing on the effect of abstention on the stability of the mean voter equilibrium. Two distinct approaches for modeling abstention are explored: (1) voters abstain if party platforms are too similar to each other and (2) voters abstain if both party platforms are far away from their ideal points.

Date: 2000-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:safiwp:00-07-040

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