Incentive-Enhancing Preferences: Personality, Behavior and Earnings

Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis and Melissa Osborne Groves

Working Papers from Santa Fe Institute

Abstract: Suppose there is a principal-agent relationship between employer and employee in which effort is not contractible, but is elicited through employer incentive mechanisms. We term preferences that allow the employer to elicit effort at lower cost incentive enhancing. We analyze how such preferences affect earnings, and then provide evidence that one of the relevant behavioral traits, efficacy, as well as other psychological aspects of individuals, are signifiant influences on earnings. We conclude that measures of cognitive performance are not sufficient indicators of the effectiveness of schools in promoting student labor market success, incentive enhancing preferences are irreducibly heterogeneous, incentive enhancing preferences help explain the persistence of poverty over generations within families and, unlike cognitive skills, incentive-enhancing traits need not be welfare increasing for their bearers.

Date: 2001-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-pke
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