Non-Explanatory Equilibria: An Extremely Simple Game With (Mostly) Unattainable Fixed Points

Joshua M. Epstein and Ross A. Hammond

Working Papers from Santa Fe Institute

Abstract: Equilibrium analysis pervades mathematical social science. This paper calls into question the explanatory significance of equilibrium by offering an extremely simple game, most of whose equilibria are unattainable in principle from any of its initial conditions. Moreover, the number of computation steps required to reach those (few) equilibria that are attainable is shown to grow exponentially with the number of players--making long-run equilibrium a poor predictor of the gameâs observed state. The paper also poses a number of combinatorially challenging problems raised by the model.

Keywords: Mathematical social science; game theory equilibrium; explanation; attainability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-08
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:safiwp:01-08-043

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