Common Knowledge

John Geanakoplos

Working Papers from Santa Fe Institute

Abstract: This paper surveys the implications of ``common knowledge'' in interactive epistemology and game theory, with special emphasis on speculation, betting, agreeing to disagree, and coordination. The implications of approximate common knowledge are also analyzed. Approximate common knowledge is defined three ways: as knowledge; and as weak {\it p}-common knowledge. Finally the implications of common knowleged are examined when agents are boundedly rational.

Date: 1993-09
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:safiwp:93-09-059

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