The Localisation of Interaction and Learning in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Robert Hoffmann () and
Working Papers from Santa Fe Institute
The evolution of cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma depends on the conditions under which the game is played. The results of a series of computer simulations show that the emergence of cooperative play in the game is strongly affected by the localisations of both interaction and learning. While the localisation of learning promotes mutual cooperation, the localisation of interaction has an ambiguous effect on it. Moreover, the localisation of learning seems to promote disequilibrium behaviour in the system.
Keywords: Prisoner's dilemma; neighbourhoods; genetic algorithms; finite automata (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wop:safiwp:96-08-064
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Santa Fe Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().