Zones of Cooperation in Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma

Joshua M. Epstein

Working Papers from Santa Fe Institute

Abstract: The emergence of cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games is generally assumed to require repeated play (and strategies such as Tit-For-Tat, involving memory of previous interactions) or features ("tags") permitting cooperators and defectors to distinguish one another. In the Demographic Prisoner's Dilemma, neither assumption is made: agents with finite vision move to random sites on a lattice and play a fixed culturally-inherited zero-memory strategy of cooperate (C) or defect (D) against neighbors. Agents are indistinguishable to one another--they are "tagless". Positive payoffs accrue to agents playing C against C, or D against C. Negative payoffs accrue to agents playing C against D, or D against D. Payoffs accumulate. If accumulated payoffs exceed some threshold, agents clone offspring of the same strategy onto neighboring sites and continue play. If accumulated payoffs are negative, agents die and are removed. Spatial zones of cooperation emerge.

Keywords: Eeconomics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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