Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action

Pranab Bardhan and Nirvikar Singh

Development and Comp Systems from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets.

JEL-codes: C72 D30 D70 O10 P0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2004-07-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: 33 pages, Acrobat .pdf
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/dev/papers/0407/0407003.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action (2004)
Working Paper: Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action (2004)
Working Paper: Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action (2004)
Working Paper: Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0407003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Development and Comp Systems from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).